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OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellee, Richard Gardiner, objects to the Appellant's 
Statement of Facts in that the Appellant has not provided any 
citation to the record supporting the alleged facts. Furthermore, 
the Appellee provides herein a statement of facts which accurately 
reflects the evidence presented to the Court. The Appellee further 
objects to any Appellant's alleged facts which contradict the 
Appellee's Statement of Facts found herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Gardiner filed a Complaint for judgment (in the form of a 
Warrant in Debt) against Interport, Inc. ("Interport") in the 
General District Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. See Record, p. 
217, para. 1. The Warrant in Debt was mailed to the Interport's 
registered agent on August 2, 2000 and was received on August 5, 
2000. Record, p. 217, para. 1. The Warrant of Debt was served on 
Interport's registered agent on August 18, 2000. Id. Gardiner 
obtained a judgment against Interport on January 3, 2001, in the 
amount of $7,182.95, plus interest (at a rate of nine percent (9%) 
per annum), and costs in the amount of $37.00 as of January 3, 
2001. Id. at para. 2. This Virginia judgment was filed as a 
foreign judgment with the Millard County District Court on May 8, 
2001. Record, p. 1. 
On August 28, 2000, 23 days after it received notice of the 
pending lawsuit, Interport, by its President, William York, ("Mr. 
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York") transferred the only asset of any value it owned, the 
warehouse, to his mother, Betty York ("York") and father Record, p. 
217, para. 4. After the Conveyance, Interport continued to use the 
warehouse for its own purposes and as its only place of business. 
Id. at para. 5. 
Since Interport had conveyed the warehouse to York, Mr. 
Gardiner was forced to file a petition for relief pursuant to the 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act adding the Appellant as a party. At 
trial, York did not present any evidence that Interport owed her or 
her husband any money. Id. at para. 10. After the trial with 
York, the Trial Court held that Interport's conveyance was a 
fraudulent transfer. Record, p. 217, Order of the Court para. 1. 
The Court allowed Mr. Gardiner to have a judgment lien on the 
asset. Record, p. 217, Order of the Court para. 4. 
ARGUMENT 
STANDARD 
The standard of review regarding this appeal is whether or not 
the Trial Court's findings were "clearly erroneous." See, Jeffs v. 
Stubbs, supra, 970 P.2d at 1240. Moreover, this Court reviews the 
issue allowing "a trial court discretion in its application of the 
law to a given fact situation." Tolle v. Fenley, 132 P.3d 63, 66 
(Utah App. 2006) . As the following demonstrates, the Trial Court's 
rulings were not clearly erroneous. 
The Record Supports a Finding that the Conveyance 
Violated the Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
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After the trial with York, the Court held that Interport's 
conveyance was a fraudulent transfer based upon two different 
theories: one, that the conveyance "was made with the intent to 
hinder, delay or defraud its creditor, [Mr. Gardiner]," Record, p. 
217, Para. 1; and two, that the Interport "did not receive 
^reasonably equivalent value in exchange' for the warehouse causing 
Interport to incur debt beyond its ability to pay." Id. at para. 
3. Because of this ruling, the Court allowed Mr. Gardiner to have 
a judgment lien on the warehouse Interport conveyed to York. Id. at 
para. 4. The Appellant has now appealed the Trial Court's decision 
arguing error in each of the alternate finding's that Interport 
fraudulently conveyed the property. As the following demonstrates, 
the Appellant's arguments are without merit and should be summarily 
dismissed. 
A) The trial court ruled that Interport "did not receive 
^reasonably equivalent value in exchange' for the warehouse causing 
Interport to incur debt beyond its ability to pay." Id. Order at 
para. 3. York challenges the Trial Court's ruling arguing that 
Utah Code Section 25-6-5 (1) (b) (ii) "refers to debt that would be 
incurred subsequent to the transfer, not preceding it." Appellant 
Brief (hereinafter "Brief") at 6. As the following demonstrates, 
the Appellant's argument is without merit and should be summarily 
dismissed. 
Utah Code § 25-6-5 (1) (b) (ii) states in pertinent part as 
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follows: 
(1) A transfer made . . . by a debtor is fraudulent as to 
a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or 
after the transfer was made . . . , if the debtor made the 
transfer . . .: 
* * * 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for the transfer . . .; and the debtor: 
-k -k -k 
(ii) . . . believed or reasonably should have believed 
that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as 
they became due. 
Thus, Subsection (b) (ii) "addresses situations where the 
following occurs: 1) the debtor transfers property without 
receiving equivalent value in the exchange; and 2) would incur 
debts beyond the debtors ability to pay. 
In short, York is not disputing that Interport did not receive 
adequate value for the Conveyance only that Subsection (ii) "refers 
to future debts." Id. York supports her contention by arguing that 
there "was no testimony or evidence whatsoever presented at trial 
which showed that Interport was about to or intended to incur debts 
beyond its ability to pay as they became due." Id. 
The Appellant provides no case law to support such an 
interpretation of the statute. Clearly, the statute defines a 
fraudulent transfer in situations where the debtor disposes (or 
hides) assets to avoid debts that it has incurred, especially when 
a judgment is eminent. The statute simply sets aside a conveyance 
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for less than value in exchange when the conveyance caused the 
debtor to become insolvent. This is exactly the situation present 
in this matter. This Court should resist the Appellant's skewed 
reading of the statute. 
Even if this Court were to consider Appellant's contentions, 
Interport incurred a debt after the conveyance beyond its ability 
to pay. The trial court found that Interport's registered agent 
received notice of the Warrant in Debt by mail on or about August 
5, 2000 and was served by personal process on or about August 18, 
2000 Record, p. 217 Finding of Fact para. 1 The transfer of the 
warehouse occurred on August 28, 2000. Id. at para. 5. On January 
3, 2001, the Virginia Court entered judgment against Interport. 
Clearly, these facts clearly establish the element of Section 
(b)(ii) that Interport's conveyance caused it to incur debt beyond 
its ability to pay. Interport "reasonably should have believed" 
that a judgment would result because of a Warrant in Debt action. 
Interport transferred the warehouse (its only asset of any 
value)with full knowledge that it "would incur debts [a judgment] 
beyond [its] ability to pay as they became due." The trial court's 
conclusion that the transfer was fraudulent under Utah Code § 25-6-
5(l)(b)(ii) must be sustained. Its conclusion was not "clearly 
erroneous." 
B) The trial court ruled that the conveyance in question was 
fraudulent because the conveyance was done with "actual intent" to 
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hinder, delay or defraud as defined by Utah Code § 25-6-5(1)(a). 
York argues that the Trial Court's finding was not "justified or 
supported by anything placed in evidence." Brief at 7. As the 
following demonstrates the Appellant's argument is without merit 
and should be dismissed. 
Utah Code 25-6-5(2) provides that, to determine "actual 
intent" under Subsection (1) (a) , "consideration may be given, among 
other factors, to whether" 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the 
property transferred after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was 
incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor 
was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset 
transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly 
after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after 
a substantial debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the 
business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an 
insider of the debtor. 
The trial court found that factors (a), (b), (d), (e) and (h) 
demonstrating actual intent were present in the transfer in 
question. Order Para. 2. As shown below, the Trial Court's 
decision was correct and supported by the facts of the case—it was 
not "clearly erroneous." 
(a) The transfer or obligation was to an insider. York asserts 
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that she and her husband were not "insiders" because there was no 
evidence that they were officers or stockholders of Interport nor 
did they "had any inside position . . . ." Brief at 7. Further, 
York asserts that the "conclusion that the parents of a corporate 
officer are insiders is unwarranted by case law or statute." Id. 
On the contrary, the statute expressly defines "insider" to 
include "a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or 
person in control of the debtor . . . ." Utah Code § 25-6-
2(7) (b) (vii) . Thus, as a matter of law, York and her husband were 
insiders. 
(b) The debtor retained possession or control of the property 
transferred after the transfer. York asserts that the testimony 
presented at trial does not support a finding that the debtor 
retained possession and control of the property. The Appellant 
quotes page 35 of the Trial Transcript where Mr. York, the 
President of Interport, acknowledged that the warehouse in question 
was still being used as storage for property belonging to Interport 
(or had belonged to Interport). Record P. 272, p.35. 
Furthermore, Mr. York, as the former president of Interport who had 
made the transfer, was asked: "[Y]ou came here for a supplemental 
hearing, correct, and I asked you some questions. Do you recall 
that?" Id. at p.35. The witness responded "Yes." Id. He was 
then asked: "I asked you if you had stuff in the warehouse, and you 
said you still had some of your stuff in the warehouse, correct?" 
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(Id.) The witness, Mr. York, responded: "Yes." Id. Thus, there 
was testimony supporting the trial court's finding that "Interport 
through its president, Mr. York, retained control and use of the 
warehouse." Record p.217, para. 2. The Trial Court's ruling was 
not "clearly erroneous." 
(d) Before the transfer was made, the debtor had been sued or 
threatened with suit. The Trial Court concluded that Interport was 
aware of the lawsuit filed by Mr. Gardiner prior to Interport's 
conveyance of the warehouse to York. York argues that such a 
finding "requires a leap of faith." Brief at 8. As the following 
demonstrates, the Appellant's position is without merit and should 
be summarily dismissed. 
The testimony unequivocally stated that Gardiner mailed a copy 
of the Warrant In Debt to Interport's registered agent on or about 
August 2, 2000 and that the Complaint was served on the registered 
agent on August 18, 2000.; Record p. 217, p. 17. This notice clearly 
occurred prior to August 28 when the property was conveyed. 
In Nevada, where Interport was incorporated,"'[s]ervice of 
process' is a formal delivery of documents that is legally 
sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending 
action." R. Griggs Group Ltd. v. Filanto Spa, 920 F.Supp. 1100 
(D.Nev. 1996). Thus, as a matter of law, Interport had notice of 
the suit by August 5 (at the latest, August 18) which was 
significantly prior to Interport's August 28th conveyance. 
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Interport owned the property—not its President Mr. York. Mr. 
York, as the President, conveyed the property. Mr. Gardiner was 
not required, as the Appellant argues, to establish when Mr. York 
became aware of the suit-only when Interport had notice. Because 
Interport had notice at least by August 18, that it was being sued. 
Accordingly, the trial court's finding was not "clearly erroneous." 
(e) The transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets: 
The Trial Court found that the warehouse was Interport's only asset 
of value. York asserts that the only evidence supporting this 
ruling was Gardiner's testimony that "the only assets that 
Interport had was this warehouse." Record p.272 Trial Transcript 
at p. 20. York argues that this testimony was "hearsay evidence 
from an unqualified source . . . ." Brief at 9. 
The Trial Transcript reflects, however, that York did not 
object to either the testimony nor its source and did not cross-
examine Mr. Gardiner on this fact. Thus, by "failing to object, 
the defendants waived any objections . . . ." Gerard v. Young, 432 
P.2d 343, 20 Utah 2d 30 ;(Utah, 1967). See also Rule 103(a), Utah 
Rules of Evidence: 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits . 
. . evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and . . . [i]n case the ruling is one admitting 
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears 
of record . . . . 
York never disputed or otherwise challenged this testimony. 
This silence amounts to admission that the warehouse was the only 
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asset. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the warehouse 
was the only asset of value was not "clearly erroneous/'1 
(h) The value of the consideration received by the debtor was 
not reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred. 
The trial court found that "Mr. York's parents did not provide 
value for the asset." (Record, p.217 para.2) York argues that this 
finding is "clearly disproved by the evidence." Brief at 10. York 
then supports her assertion by stating that "Mr. York in his 
testimony repeated (sic) stated that money was owed to Senior York 
and Mrs. York due to various business transactions." York cites to 
testimony found on pages 30-31 of the trial transcript to support 
her generalization. Brief at 10. As the following demonstrates, 
careful reading of the testimony on those pages, however, does not 
support the Appellant's contentions. 
Absent from the record and from the Appellant's Brief is any 
testimony about the amount of the principle owed nor any evidence 
regarding the status of the loan at the time the warehouse was 
transferred. Indeed, on cross-examination, Mr. York was asked "you 
have no idea what you owed your parents?" to which he responded: 
"No, I have no idea . . . ." Record, p. 272, at p. 38. The trial 
judge also asked Mr. York whether he had his parents "sign any 
1
 York also contends that there was there was no evidence of 
whether there was "substantial cash in the bank or goods." Brief 
at 10. Plainly, the finding that the warehouse was the only asset 
of value logically means that there were no other assets of value, 
such as cash or goods. 
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document indicating that the debt was paid off?" to which Mr. York 
answered: "I don't recall that, no. I don't believe so." Id. at 
42. 
When York herself testified, she offered Exhibit No. 6 which 
purported to show the debt Interport owed to her and her husband. 
Id. at 43-44. The trial court, however, observed that Exhibit No. 
6 referred to "monies owed by Bill. They don't indicate that the 
money is owed by the corporation." Id. 52. 
Based on the above testimony, the Trial Court found that there 
"is no evidence that the corporation owed monies to William and 
Betty York." Id. at 52. Moreover, the court found that, even if 
it interpreted Mr. York's testimony to support the contention that 
Senior York loaned Interport $50,000 and that the loans reflected 
in Exhibit No. 6 were to Interport, 
the most the debt could be is around 70,000 - $69,000. 
The evidence that the Court has been presented with is 
that this - this particular property has an assessed 
value by Millard County of around 130,000. Mr. York has 
testified that he is trying to sell the property for 
345,000. So the 70,000 debt would be substantially less 
than what the actual value of the property is. 
Id. at 52.2 
2
 York argues that, while the warehouse "is valued at 
$130,000 for purposes of taxation there is also testimony that the 
property is white elephant" because it "has been on the market for 
years and shows sign (sic) of moving." Brief at 11. York omits 
the reasons the warehouse has been on the market for years and 
shows no signs of moving. Mr. York has merely put a sign on it 
(Trial Transcript at 34) and has not engaged a realtor {Id. at 35) 
and, most critically, is attempting to sell the warehouse for 
$360,000. Id. 35. Thus, the evidence does not support York's 
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Thus, the trial court's conclusion that Mr. York's parents did 
not provide value for the asset was not clearly erroneous." 3 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the Trial Court's ruling that the 
conveyance in question was fraudulent as to Mr. Gardiner. Mr. 
Gardiner should be able to levy execution on the property. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard E. Gardiner 
By counsel 
James K. Slavens 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
(435) 743-4225 
assertion that the warehouse is a white elephant and York's 
contention that transferring the warehouse "in exchange for a 
$50,000 loan could easily be construed as an equivalent exchange" 
is frivolous and cannot be supported from the record. 
3
 It is thus irrelevant whether the 2002 tax return shows 
loans to Interport of $23,432 and $4,000 because, even assuming 
that those were loans to Interport, those loans would, in the trial 
court's words, "be substantially less than what the actual value of 
(what) the property is."' Id. at 52. 
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